Defeasible reasoning with variable degrees of justification

被引:89
作者
Pollock, JL [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Arizona, Dept Philosophy, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
defeasible; defeat; justification; reasoning; nonmonotonic;
D O I
10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00145-X
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
The question addressed in this paper is how the degree of justification of a belief is determined. A conclusion may be supported by several different arguments, the arguments typically being defeasible, and there may also be arguments of varying strengths for defeaters for some of the supporting arguments. What is sought is a way of computing the "on sum" degree of justification of a conclusion in terms of the degrees of justification of all relevant premises and the strengths of all relevant reasons. I have in the past defended various principles pertaining to this problem. In this paper I reaffirm some of those principles but propose a significantly different final analysis. Specifically, I endorse the weakest link, principle for the computation of argument strengths. According to this principle the degree of justification an argument confers on its conclusion in the absence of other relevant arguments is the minimum of the degrees of justification of its premises and the strengths of the reasons employed in the argument. I reaffirm my earlier rejection of the accrual of reasons, according to which two arguments for a conclusion can result in a higher degree of justification than either argument by itself. This paper diverges from my earlier theory mainly in its treatment of defeaters. First, it argues that defeaters that are too weak to defeat an inference outright may still diminish the strength of the conclusion. Second, in the past I have also denied that multiple defeaters can result in the defeat of an argument that is not defeated by any of the defeaters individually. In this paper I urge that there are compelling examples that support a limited version of this "collaborative" defeat. The need to accommodate diminishers and collaborative defeat has important consequences for the computation of degrees of justification. The paper proposes a characterization of degrees of justification that captures the various principles endorsed and constructs an algorithm for computing them. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:233 / 282
页数:50
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