Political connections and stock price crash risk: evidence of institutional investors' heterogeneous monitoring

被引:13
作者
Tee, Chwee Ming [1 ]
机构
[1] Monash Univ, Sch Business, Malaysian Campus, Sunway, Selangor, Malaysia
来源
SPANISH JOURNAL OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING-REVISTA ESPANOLA DE FINANCIACION Y CONTABILIDAD | 2019年 / 48卷 / 01期
关键词
Politically connected firms; institutional investors' heterogeneous monitoring; stock price crash risk; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; AUDITOR CHOICE; FIRMS; COMPENSATION; TRANSPARENCY; EARNINGS; IMPACT; COST; PAY;
D O I
10.1080/02102412.2018.1461461
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the monitoring effectiveness of different types of institutional investors on the association between politically connected firms (PCFs) and stock price crash risk. Using a sample of Malaysian firms from 2002-2012, the study finds that PCFs are positively associated with stock price crash risk, consistent with the theory of crony capitalism and political patronage. However, effective monitoring by institutional investors attenuates crash risk in PCFs. Finally, the findings reveal that only monitoring by pressure-resistant institutional investors can alleviate the risk of crashes in PCF's stock prices. This concurs with the theory of business relationship, and suggests that institutional investors should not be seen as a homogeneous group.
引用
收藏
页码:50 / 67
页数:18
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