Political connections and stock price crash risk: evidence of institutional investors' heterogeneous monitoring

被引：13

作者：

Tee, Chwee Ming ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Monash Univ, Sch Business, Malaysian Campus, Sunway, Selangor, Malaysia

来源：

SPANISH JOURNAL OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING-REVISTA ESPANOLA DE FINANCIACION Y CONTABILIDAD | 2019年 / 48卷 / 01期

关键词：

Politically connected firms; institutional investors' heterogeneous monitoring; stock price crash risk; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; AUDITOR CHOICE; FIRMS; COMPENSATION; TRANSPARENCY; EARNINGS; IMPACT; COST; PAY;

D O I：

10.1080/02102412.2018.1461461

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study examines the monitoring effectiveness of different types of institutional investors on the association between politically connected firms (PCFs) and stock price crash risk. Using a sample of Malaysian firms from 2002-2012, the study finds that PCFs are positively associated with stock price crash risk, consistent with the theory of crony capitalism and political patronage. However, effective monitoring by institutional investors attenuates crash risk in PCFs. Finally, the findings reveal that only monitoring by pressure-resistant institutional investors can alleviate the risk of crashes in PCF's stock prices. This concurs with the theory of business relationship, and suggests that institutional investors should not be seen as a homogeneous group.

引用

页码：50 / 67

页数：18

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