Local enforcement and better forests

被引：324

作者：

Gibson, CC ^{[1
]}

Williams, JT

Ostrom, E

机构：

[1] Univ Calif San Diego, San Diego, CA 92103 USA

[2] Univ Calif Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521 USA

[3] Indiana Univ, Bloomington, IN USA

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2005年 / 33卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

forestry; resource management; monitoring and sanctioning; collective action;

D O I：

10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.07.013

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

Current studies of local resource management examine many factors thought to be associated with good resource conditions. Despite the number of studies and the importance of such resources to millions of people worldwide, a lack of theory and hypothesis testing beyond the case level limits the lessons empirical studies offer. We argue that regular monitoring and sanctioning of rules-rule enforcement-is a necessary condition for successful resource management. We test our theory using data regarding 178 user groups and by pairing rule enforcement with other important factors: social capital, formal organization, and dependence on forest products. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：273 / 284

页数：12

共 54 条

[1] The moonlighting game - An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution [J].