Board structure and CEO compensation: Evidence from U.S. lodging industry

被引：35

作者：

Ozdemir, Ozgur ^{[1
]}

Upneja, Arun ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Penn State Univ, Sch Hospitality Management, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

[2] Penn State Univ, Schreyer Honors Coll, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY MANAGEMENT | 2012年 / 31卷 / 03期

关键词：

Board of directors; CEO compensation; Board independence; Firm performance; CHIEF EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP; INCENTIVES; PAY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijhm.2011.10.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Using a sample of U.S. lodging firms, this paper examines the relationship between board of director characteristics and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Previous research shows that larger boards are detrimental to the effectiveness of the board of directors and deteriorate the control imposed on CEO actions and pay. Board independence is also suggested as an important quality to emphasize the control on the CEO. We propose that U.S. lodging firms' board of directors provide a nice setting to investigate the effects of size and independence on CEO compensation level. Our findings suggest that CEO compensation is not related to board size, and positively related to proportion of the outside board members. These findings are contrary to the findings of previous studies. Our findings may provide significant insights to lodging firms' board of directors to structure efficient compensation packages. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：856 / 863

页数：8

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