Apple's disaster: Linking two-sided markets and strategic delegation

被引:5
作者
Ribeiro, Vitor Miguel [1 ]
机构
[1] Autoridade Nacl Comunicacoes, Ave Jose Malhoa 12, P-1099017 Lisbon, Portugal
关键词
MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; COMPETITION; OLIGOPOLY; EQUILIBRIUM; PRICE;
D O I
10.1002/mde.2865
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Asymmetric pricing structure and different intergroup network externalities are characteristics of two-sided markets not captured in the analysis of one-sided markets. Focusing on Cournot duopoly where membership decision may be delegated to a manager, several equilibrium regimes are sustained depending on the fixed cost of managerial hiring and strength of the network externality exerted by the side whose demand is more price sensitive. The change from null to full delegation sharpens the asymmetric pricing structure and reduces the price level in two-sided markets. Contrary to one-sided markets with direct network effects, the prisoner's dilemma holds for sufficiently strong indirect network externalities. Imperfect interside discrimination of managerial incentives ensures profit maximization and efficient consumers' allocation. Private hiring should occur when the two-sided market exhibits symmetric pricing structure. An explanation for Apple's unprecedented event is provided. The reduction of revenue and managerial bonus in 2016 may be justified by the dissemination of full delegation in the Chinese information technology industry. Apple's upcoming strategy may consist on reducing both access prices, although the side whose demand is more price sensitive should have a greater price reduction. Alternatively, improving the content quality may constitute Apple's corporate strategy, thereby inducing a skimming pricing strategy on Chinese rivals.
引用
收藏
页码:32 / 45
页数:14
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