Research on the Revelation Mechanism of Status of Partners' Infrastructure in Logistics Enterprise Alliance

被引：0
作者：
Hu, Zhengdong [1 ]
Li, Xiamiao [1 ]
Liu, Dapeng [1 ]
Tan, Feiyan [2 ]
机构：
[1] Cent South Univ Technol, Sch Traff & Transportat Engn, Changsha 410075, Hunan, Peoples R China
[2] Hunan Univ, Sch Econ & Trade, Changsha 410079, Peoples R China
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF 2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LOGISTICS SYSTEMS AND INTELLIGENT MANAGEMENT, VOLS 1-3 | 2010年
关键词：
Logistics Enterprise Alliance; Partners; Revelation Mechanism; Game Theory;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TH [机械、仪表工业];
学科分类号：
0802 ;
摘要：
Partners in logistics enterprise alliance show the true state of its infrastructure, which is the premise to achieve efficient operation of the alliance. In the practice, the partners maybe don't show their real status of infrastructure in pursuit of maximizing their own interests. Based on theory of mechanism design and revelation mechanism in game theory, this paper establishes principal-agent model in order to maximize the central logistics enterprises' interests. The model spurs partners to be honest by punishing partners who can not show their true state of infrastructure, and makes them unprofitable. The empirical analysis of this model has been verified.
引用
收藏
页码：1008 / +
页数：3
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