Corporate relationship spending and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign

被引:83
作者
Hu , Juncheng [1 ]
Li, Xiaorong [2 ]
Duncan, Keith [1 ]
Xu , Jia [1 ]
机构
[1] Bond Univ, Bond Business Sch, Robina, Australia
[2] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Finance & Taxat, Beijing, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Crash risk; Relationship; Business entertainment expenses; Anti-corruption campaign; SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; STAKEHOLDER THEORY; ANALYST COVERAGE; ENTERTAINMENT; GOVERNANCE; IMPACT; GUANXI; FIRMS; TRANSPARENCY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105758
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines whether corporate relationship spending through business entertainment expenses (BEEs) affects future stock price crash risk. Stakeholder theory suggests that expenditure on relationship building with external stakeholders enhances trust, firm reputation, and transparency, potentially lowering future crash risk. However, agency theory suggests that excessive relationship spending is associated with greater information opacity and managerial opportunism, contributing to greater future crash risk. Our results are more aligned with the agency perspective, showing that BEEs relate positively to future crash risk. China's 2012 anti-corruption campaign significantly moderated the effect of BEEs on stock price crash risk, particularly for firms having weak political connections, weak information transparency, and weak external monitoring mechanisms. The positive BEE-crash relation persists after the anti-corruption campaign for high financial risk firms. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:21
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