The effect of cooperative infrastructure fees on high-speed rail and airline competition

被引：6

作者：

Alvarez-SanJaime, Oscar ^{[1
,2
]}

Cantos-Sanchez, Pedro ^{[3
,4
]}

Moner-Colonques, Rafael ^{[3
,4
]}

Sempere-Monerris, Jose J. ^{[5
,6
,7
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Valencia, Dept Econ Anal, Brussels, Belgium

[2] Univ Valencia, IEI, Brussels, Belgium

[3] Univ Valencia, Dept Econ Anal, Campus Dels Tarongers, Valencia 46022, Spain

[4] Univ Valencia, ERI CES, Campus Dels Tarongers, Valencia 46022, Spain

[5] Univ Valencia, Dept Econ Anal, Lovain La Neuve, Belgium

[6] Univ Valencia, ERI CES, Lovain La Neuve, Belgium

[7] CORE UCL, Lovain La Neuve, Belgium

来源：

TRANSPORT POLICY | 2021年 / 112卷

关键词：

Airline; Rail; Intermodal substitutability and; complementarity; Upstream cooperation; Endogenous infrastructure per-passenger fees; STRATEGIC FORMATION; ACCESS CHARGES; PRIVATIZATION; PRICE; OWNERSHIP; ALLIANCES; ECONOMICS; AIRPORTS; FORMS; HUB;

D O I：

10.1016/j.tranpol.2021.08.010

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper explores the effects of cooperation between rail and air infrastructures in setting per-passenger fees prior to competition among airlines and high-speed rail (HSR) in a transport network. It is shown that, for a sufficiently low degree of substitution, cooperation results in lower fees and greater HSR traffic than under competition. Besides, it leads to more connecting passengers. An empirical application allows for a quantitative assessment of cooperation. Gains to passengers and operators are sizeable when cooperation either involves all infrastructure managers or the rail and the hub airport managers. Welfare gains are in the range of 10.4-11.1%. Our contribution offers an ex-ante analysis about the benefits of intermodal cooperation at the upstream level.

引用

页码：125 / 141

页数：17

共 42 条

[1] Pricing and infrastructure fees in shaping cooperation in a model of high-speed rail and airline competition
Alvarez-SanJaime, Oscar
Cantos-Sanchez, Pedro
Moner-Colonques, Rafael
Sempere-Monerris, Jose J.
[J]. TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL, 2020, 140 : 22 - 41
[2] A three-stage competition game in an air transport network under asymmetric valuation of flight frequencies
Alvarez-Sanjaime, Oscar
Cantos-Sanchez, Pedro
Moner-Colonques, Rafael
Sempere-Monerris, Jose J.
[J]. ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION, 2020, 21
[3] Rail access charges and internal competition in high speed trains
Alvarez-SanJaime, Oscar
Cantos-Sanchez, Pedro
Moner-Colonques, Rafael
Sempere-Monerris, Jose J.
[J]. TRANSPORT POLICY, 2016, 49 : 184 - 195
[4] [Anonymous], 2017, ATA ANN REPORT
[5] Railway reforms: do they influence operating efficiency?
Asmild, Mette
Holvad, Torben
Hougaard, Jens Leth
Kronborg, Dorte
[J]. TRANSPORTATION, 2009, 36 (05) : 617 - 638
[6] Strategic formation and welfare effects of airline-high speed rail agreements
Avenali, Alessandro
Bracaglia, Valentina
D'Alfonso, Tiziana
Reverberi, Pierfrancesco
[J]. TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL, 2018, 117 : 393 - 411
[7] Intercontinental-airport regulation
Benoot, W.
Brueckner, J. K.
Proost, S.
[J]. TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL, 2013, 52 : 56 - 72
[8] Bilotkach V, 2005, J TRANSP ECON POLICY, V39, P167
[9] The economics of international codesharing: an analysis of airline alliances
Brueckner, JK
[J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2001, 19 (10) : 1475 - 1498
[10] Campos J., 2012, Economic analysis of high-speed rail in Europe

← 1 2 3 4 5 →