The association between human resource investment by audit firms and their audit quality

被引:14
作者
Kang, Minjung [1 ]
Lee, Ho-Young [2 ]
Son, Myungsoo [3 ]
Stein, Michael [4 ]
机构
[1] Incheon Natl Univ, Coll Business Adm, Incheon, South Korea
[2] Yonsei Univ, Sch Business, Seoul, South Korea
[3] Calif State Univ Fullerton, Mihaylo Coll Business & Econ, Fullerton, CA 92634 USA
[4] Old Dominion Univ, Strome Coll Business, Norfolk, VA USA
关键词
Audit quality; human resources investment; discretionary accruals; conservatism; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION; ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; NONAUDIT SERVICES; PERFORMANCE; ACCRUALS; PAY;
D O I
10.1080/16081625.2016.1214605
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Utilizing unique data available only in Korea, we examine the association between investment in human resources and audit quality provided by audit firms. While human resources investment is important in improving audit quality, few studies have examined this association mainly because public data about human resources investment and financial statements of audit firms are unavailable. Using two proxies for audit quality (i.e. discretionary accruals and accounting conservatism), we provide evidence that higher compensation in audit firms improves audit quality. In addition, we find higher audit quality in audit firms with higher education expenses, when audit quality is measured by the level of conservatism of clients' financial statements. These results support regulators' stance that quality control through human resources investment in audit firms can effectively improve audit quality and therefore the quality of clients' financial reporting. However, we find no association between education expenses and the average absolute value of discretionary accruals of audit clients. These results generally suggest that direct investment in human capital (i.e. compensation) is more effective in improving audit quality than indirect investment in human capital (i.e. education expenses).
引用
收藏
页码:249 / 271
页数:23
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