Is Sensationalist Disinformation More Effective? Three Facilitating Factors at the National, Individual, and Situational Level

被引:16
作者
Staender, Anna [1 ]
Humprecht, Edda [1 ]
Esser, Frank [1 ]
Morosoli, Sophie [2 ]
Van Aelst, Peter [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zurich, Dept Commun & Media Res, Zurich, Switzerland
[2] Univ Antwerp, Dept Polit Sci, Antwerp, Belgium
基金
瑞士国家科学基金会;
关键词
Disinformation; social media; COVID-19; tabloid; alternative media; TELEVISION-NEWS; UNITED-STATES; FALSE NEWS; FAKE NEWS; MEDIA; COMMUNICATION; EMOTIONS; MODEL;
D O I
10.1080/21670811.2021.1966315
中图分类号
G2 [信息与知识传播];
学科分类号
05 ; 0503 ;
摘要
Throughout the current global health crisis, false and misleading content has proliferated on social media. Previous research indicates that users of social media primarily share information that contains attention-grabbing elements. Because sensationalist elements are prevalent in disinformation, this study examines the role of sensationalism in supporting disinformation. We conducted survey experiments in six countries (N = 7,009), presenting versions of a false claim that differed in their degree of sensationalism. We varied three contextual conditions for disinformation support: whether respondents grew up in a tabloid-oriented national news culture, whether they indicated individual usage preferences for tabloid and alternative media, and how they rated their situational uncertainty during the pandemic. Our results show a weak influence of tabloidized cultures, but people who frequently use tabloid or alternative media are more likely to agree with disinformation. Users who are uncertain about what is true and what is false are also more likely to agree with disinformation, especially when it is presented sensationally. The average user, however, is more likely to agree with disinformation that is presented neutrally. This finding is concerning, as disinformation presented in a sober manner is much harder to detect by those who want to fight the "infodemic."
引用
收藏
页码:976 / 996
页数:21
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