On strategic stability in discontinuous games

被引：7
作者：
Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol [1 ]
机构：
[1] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Econ, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2011年 / 113卷 / 02期
关键词：
Infinite game; Normal-form game; Strategic stability; Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; PURE STRATEGIES; EQUILIBRIA;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.007
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We identify a class of discontinuous normal-form games whose members possess strategically stable sets, defined according to an infinite-game extension of Kohlberg and Mertens's (1986) equilibrium concept, and show that, generically, a set is stable if and only if it contains a single Nash equilibrium. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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收藏
页码：120 / 123
页数：4
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