Managing Consumer Returns in a Competitive Environment

被引:184
作者
Shulman, Jeffrey D. [1 ]
Coughlan, Anne T. [2 ]
Savaskan, R. Canan [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Washington, Michael G Foster Sch Business, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
[2] Northwestern Univ, Kellogg Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[3] So Methodist Univ, Edwin L Cox Sch Business, Dallas, TX 75275 USA
关键词
marketing; channels of distribution; competitive strategy; pricing; PRODUCT; INFORMATION; GOODS;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1100.1274
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the pricing and restocking fee decisions of two competing firms selling horizontally differentiated products. We model a duopoly facing consumers who have heterogeneous tastes for the products and who must experience a product before knowing how well it matches with their preferences. The analysis yields several key insights. Restocking fees not only can be sustained in a competitive environment, but also are more severe when consumers are less informed about product fit and when consumers place a greater importance on how well products' attributes fit with their preferences. We compare the competitive equilibrium prices to a scenario in which consumers are certain about their preferences and find conditions defining when consumer uncertainty results in higher equilibrium prices. Comparison to a monopoly setting yields a surprising result: Equilibrium restocking fees in a competitive environment can be higher than those charged by a monopolist.
引用
收藏
页码:347 / 362
页数:16
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