Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management

被引:29
作者
Chen, Yan [1 ,2 ]
Cramton, Peter [3 ]
List, John A. [4 ]
Ockenfels, Axel [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Sch Informat, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Dept Econ, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Cologne, Dept Econ, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
[4] Univ Chicago, Kenneth C Griffin Dept Econ, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会; 欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
market design; human behavior; management; APPROXIMATE COMPETITIVE-EQUILIBRIUM; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; ACADEMIC-ACHIEVEMENT EVIDENCE; CHINESE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS; SCHOOL CHOICE REFORMS; ALL-PAY AUCTIONS; FIELD EXPERIMENT; MECHANISM DESIGN; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; STRONG RECIPROCITY;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2020.3659
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We review past research and discuss future directions on how the vibrant re-search areas of market design and behavioral economics have influenced and will continue to impact the science and practice of management in both the private and public sectors. Using examples from various auction markets, reputation and feedback systems in online markets, matching markets in education, and labor markets, we demonstrate that com-bining market design theory, behavioral insights, and experimental methods can lead to fruitful implementation of superior market designs in practice.
引用
收藏
页码:5317 / 5348
页数:32
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