Does individualism matter for hedge funds? A cross-country examination

被引:6
作者
Dai, Na [1 ]
Nahata, Rajarishi [2 ]
Brauner, Aaron [1 ]
机构
[1] SUNY Albany, Albany, NY 12222 USA
[2] CUNY, Baruch Coll, New York, NY 10021 USA
基金
芬兰科学院;
关键词
Culture; Individualism; Hedge fund contracts; Risk-taking; Survival; HIGH-WATER MARKS; NATIONAL CULTURE; CAREER CONCERNS; RISK; PERFORMANCE; SURVIVAL; COMPENSATION; COLLECTIVISM; INCENTIVES; DIMENSIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102155
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine how individualism, a cultural attribute that emphasizes autonomy, ability, and self-belief, affects hedge funds (HFs). Using Hofstede's framework, we show HFs located in individualistic (IDV) cultures structure their contracts with more performance-driven incentives, take greater risk, and herd less. Individualism also influences risk-shifting behavior: after initial underperformance, HFs increase risk-taking in high IDV cultures. Yet, HFs do not outperform in individualistic countries and draw lower Sharpe ratios, which highlights the link between individualism and overconfidence/over-optimism. Interestingly, HFs' survival is less sensitive to performance in individualistic cultures, again consistent with greater autonomy and opportunities in these countries.
引用
收藏
页数:24
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