Value allocation under ambiguity

被引：17

作者：

Angelopoulos, Angelos ^{[1
]}

Koutsougeras, Leonidas C. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Manchester, Econ, Sch Social Sci, Oxford Rd, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2015年 / 59卷 / 01期

关键词：

Asymmetric information; Maxmin value allocation; Incentive compatibility; Efficiency; DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION; ECONOMY;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-014-0812-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information where individual behavior exhibits ambiguity aversion along the line of maximin expected utility decision making. For such economies, we introduce different notions of maximin value allocations. We also introduce a strong notion of incentive compatibility. We prove the existence and incentive compatibility of the maximin value allocation. We conclude that unlike the Bayesian value allocation approach in Krasa Yannelis (Econometrica 62(4):881-900, 1994), incentive compatibility is related to efficiency rather than to direct exchange of information.

引用

页码：147 / 167

页数：21

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