A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants

被引：11

作者：

Amoros, Pablo ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Malaga, Dept Teoria & Hist Econ, E-29013 Malaga, Spain

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2011年 / 110卷 / 03期

关键词：

Mechanism design; Contest; Subgame perfect equilibrium; SUBGAME PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.038

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We analyze the problem of a jury choosing the winner from a set of agents when the identity of the deserving winner is common knowledge amongst the jurors but each juror is biased in favor of one different agent. We propose a simple and natural mechanism that implements the socially optimal rule (the winner is the deserving winner) in subgame perfect equilibria. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：241 / 244

页数：4

共 8 条

[1] SUBGAME PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION - A NECESSARY AND ALMOST SUFFICIENT CONDITION [J].

ABREU, D ;

SEN, A .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1990, 50 (02) :285-299

[2] The scholarship assignment problem [J].

Amoros, P ;

Corchon, LC ;

Moreno, B .

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2002, 38 (01) :1-18

[3]

AMOROS P, 2010, PICKING WINNER UNPUB

[4] Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors [J].

Amoros, Pablo .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2009, 144 (03) :1211-1226

[5] IMPLEMENTATION IN UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES - A LOOK AT BOUNDED MECHANISMS [J].

JACKSON, MO .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1992, 59 (04) :757-775

[6] Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality [J].

Maskin, E .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1999, 66 (01) :23-38

[7] SUBGAME PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION [J].

MOORE, J ;

REPULLO, R .

ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (05) :1191-1220

[8] The theory of implementation of social choice rules [J].

Serrano, R .

SIAM REVIEW, 2004, 46 (03) :377-414

← 1 →