Analysis of the Evolutionary Game of Three Parties in Environmental Information Disclosure in Sustainability Reports of Listed Forestry Companies in China

被引:7
作者
Lu, Bowen [1 ]
Yue, Shangzhi [1 ]
机构
[1] Northeast Forestry Univ, Coll Econ & Management, Harbin 150040, Peoples R China
基金
国家教育部科学基金资助;
关键词
environmental information disclosure; three-party evolutionary game; forestry listed companies; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY;
D O I
10.3390/su14052871
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
(1) Background: In the construction of an ecological civilization in China, the forestry industry has special characteristics which can produce both ecological and economic benefits. Environmental information disclosure can help the construction of an ecological civilization system; the study of the environmental information disclosures of forestry listed companies can help the development of ecological civilization construction and is conducive to considering forestry as a pilot model and extending to other industries; (2) Methods and results: Based on evolutionary game theory and stakeholder theory, an evolutionary game model of listed forestry companies, government departments, and the public was applied with MATLAB software to simulate and analyze the influencing factors of the environmental information disclosures of listed forestry companies; (3) Suggestions: Optimization of the environmental information disclosure mechanism of forestry listed companies includes: optimization of the environmental information disclosure mechanism, the reward and punishment mechanism, the environmental information sharing mechanism, and the interest coordination mechanism.
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页数:23
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