Engineering Design of Strategies for Winning Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Competitions

被引:29
作者
Li, Jiawei [1 ]
Hingston, Philip [2 ]
Kendall, Graham [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Nottingham, Sch Comp Sci, Nottingham NG8 1BB, England
[2] Edith Cowan Univ, Sch Comp & Secur Sci, Perth, WA 6027, Australia
基金
英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;
关键词
Game theory; group strategy; iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD); opponent identification; EFFECTIVE CHOICE; GAME; COOPERATION; INFORMATION; REPUTATION; SELECTION; ALTRUISM;
D O I
10.1109/TCIAIG.2011.2166268
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
In this paper, we investigate winning strategies for round-robin iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) competitions and evolutionary IPD competitions. Since the outcome of a single competition depends on the composition of the population of participants, we propose a statistical evaluation methodology that takes into account outcomes across varying compositions. We run several series of competitions in which the strategies of the participants are randomly chosen from a set of representative strategies. Statistics are gathered to evaluate the performance of each strategy. With this approach, the conditions for some well-known strategies to win a round-robin IPD competition are analyzed. We show that a strategy that uses simple rule-based identification mechanisms to explore and exploit the opponent outperforms well-known strategies such as tit-for-tat (TFT) in most round-robin competitions. Group strategies have an advantage over nongroup strategies in evolutionary IPD competitions. Group strategies adopt different strategies in interacting with kin members and nonkin members. A simple group strategy, Clique, which cooperates only with kin members, performs well in competing against well-known IPD strategies. We introduce several group strategies developed by combining Clique with winning strategies from round-robin competitions and evaluate their performance by adapting three parameters: sole survivor rate, extinction rate, and survival time. Simulation results show that these group strategies outperform well-known IPD strategies in evolutionary IPD competitions.
引用
收藏
页码:348 / 360
页数:13
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