Partially ordered cooperative games:: extended core and Shapley value

被引：15

作者：

Puerto, J. ^{[1
]}

Fernandez, F. R. ^{[1
]}

Hinojosa, Y. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Seville, Fac Math, Dept Estadist & Invest Operat, E-41012 Seville, Spain

[2] Univ Seville, Fac CCEE, Dept Econ Aplicada 1, E-41012 Seville, Spain

来源：

ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 2008年 / 158卷 / 01期

关键词：

cooperative games; core; Shapley value; partial order;

D O I：

10.1007/s10479-007-0242-9

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes values in a partially ordered linear space. Thus, the classical solution concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined: the core concept, Shapley-Bondareva theorem and the Shapley value are extended for this class of games. The classes of standard, vector-valued and stochastic cooperative games among others are particular cases of this general theory.

引用

页码：143 / 159

页数：17

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