Within-group competition reduces cooperation and payoffs in human groups

被引:32
作者
Barker, Jessica L. [1 ]
Barclay, Pat [1 ,2 ]
Reeve, H. Kern [1 ]
机构
[1] Cornell Univ, Dept Neurobiol & Behav, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
[2] Univ Guelph, Dept Psychol, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
cooperation; humans; public goods; reproductive skew; social groups; tragedy of the commons; tug-of-war; within-group competition; BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY; FUTURE FITNESS; EVOLUTION; TRAGEDY; FOOD; RECIPROCITY; REPRODUCTION; CHIMPANZEES; GENEROSITY; INTERGROUP;
D O I
10.1093/beheco/ars020
中图分类号
B84 [心理学]; C [社会科学总论]; Q98 [人类学];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ; 030303 ; 04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Social organisms in many taxa cooperate to produce resources that are shared among group members. Some cooperatively produced resources may be monopolized by individuals who invest in within-group competition, but these have largely been overlooked in empirical and theoretical research on human cooperation, which has focused on noncontestable public goods. In this study, we allow for the potential of within-group competition over cooperatively produced resources and use a game theoretic "tug-of-war" model and empirical test to show that such competition decreases the degree of cooperation within human groups and hence decreases group members' payoffs. Our study thus sheds light on how cooperative production and equal division of shared resources may have evolved, expands on current models of human cooperation to reflect the many natural conditions with opportunities for within-group competition, and demonstrates unifying principles in cooperation and competition across the animal kingdom.
引用
收藏
页码:735 / 741
页数:7
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