Executive pensions and the pay-performance relation-Evidence from changes to pension legislation in the UK

被引:1
|
作者
Morris, Damon [1 ]
Gregory-Smith, Ian [1 ]
Main, Brian G. M. [2 ]
Montagnoli, Alberto [1 ]
Wright, Peter W. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sheffield, Dept Econ, 9 Mappin St, Sheffield S1 4DT, S Yorkshire, England
[2] Univ Edinburgh, Edinburgh Univ Business Sch, 29 Buccleuch St, Edinburgh EH8 9JS, Midlothian, Scotland
来源
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | 2021年 / 73卷 / 03期
关键词
COMPENSATION; CEOS; DEBT; PAID;
D O I
10.1093/oep/gpaa050
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article evaluates the role of executive pensions in the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. As a natural experiment, we exploit a major change to the tax-free allowances governing executive pensions. This reform affected the cost of pensions for firms whose executives had accumulated pension benefits in excess of the prescribed limit. We find a strong reaction to the reform. After 6 April 2006, many executives saw their defined benefit pension schemes replaced with risk-free cash payments. This imposition of an exogenous constraint on the contracting over CEO pay significantly decreased the relationship between executive pay and firm performance.
引用
收藏
页码:1304 / 1323
页数:20
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