Judge or Bureaucrat? How Administrative Law Judges Exercise Discretion in Welfare Bureaucracies

被引:15
作者
Lens, Vicki [1 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, Sch Social Work, New York, NY 10027 USA
关键词
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE;
D O I
10.1086/666375
中图分类号
C916 [社会工作、社会管理、社会规划];
学科分类号
1204 ;
摘要
Administrative law judges are neglected but powerful actors in public welfare bureaucracies, presiding over quasi-judicial hearings triggered if participants challenge a bureaucratic decision on public welfare benefits. Drawing on ethnographic observations of fair hearings, as well as interviews with administrative law judges and appellants, this study seeks to understand the ways in which these judges exercise discretion and how it affects the adjudication of disputes. Findings suggest that disputes generated by poorly run bureaucracies provide judges with limited opportunity to use professional skills or discretion to scrutinize bureaucratic practices. When opportunities for such judgments do arise, judges take widely divergent paths. Some align themselves with the welfare agency, enforcing bureaucratic practices rather than scrutinizing them. Others emphasize their neutrality and judicial role, scrutinizing and aligning agency practices with the law's underlying purposes.
引用
收藏
页码:269 / 293
页数:25
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