Family Talents in Family Firms

被引:7
作者
Zhang, Yanren [1 ]
机构
[1] Fudan Univ, Sch Econ, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
brain drain; family firm; family income sharing; family talent; matching; parental authority; signaling; BUSINESS GROUPS; EMERGING MARKETS; OWNERSHIP; PRODUCTIVITY;
D O I
10.1080/1540496X.2018.1510770
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Empirical studies suggest that the business talents of the heir to a family firm can have a large and significant effect on firm prospects. However, we still do not know how heirs, especially those who are good at making and executing business decisions, credibly reveal their talents to other parties, when the signal may be muddied by immense family wealth and high-profile parents. In this article, I model the turnover of talented family members, and highlight a family firm dilemma. First, a talented heir's talents will be undervalued if they involve themselves in their family business, but family firms will suffer brain drains if talented family members leave for the market. This framework and its extensions illustrate how institutional quality, capital share, and technological progress influence heir participation and family firm performance, and how a well-functioned financial system, parental authority, and family income sharing can relieve the dilemma. The main results may help to explain some of the differences in governance and performance of family firms across countries or within a given country over time.
引用
收藏
页码:496 / 512
页数:17
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