A NONTRANSITIVE THEORY OF TRUTH OVER PA

被引:0
|
作者
Dittrich, Jonathan [1 ]
机构
[1] Ludwig Maximilians Univ Munchen, Munich Ctr Math Philosophy, Munich, Germany
来源
ANALISIS FILOSOFICO | 2021年 / 41卷 / 02期
基金
欧盟地平线“2020”;
关键词
Cut; Paradox; Liar; Truth; CLASSICAL-LOGIC;
D O I
10.36446/af.2021.456
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
David Ripley has argued extensively for a nontransitive theory of truth by dropping the rule of Cut in a sequent calculus setting in order to get around triviality caused by paradoxes such as the Liar. However, comparing his theory with a wide range of classical approaches in the literature is problematic because formulating it over an arithmetical background theory such as Peano Arithmetic is non-trivial as Cut is not eliminable in Peano Arithmetic. Here we make a step towards closing this gap by providing a suitable restriction of the Cut rule, which allows for a nontransitive theory of truth over Peano Arithmetic that is proof-theoretically as strong as the strongest known classical theory of truth.
引用
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页码:273 / 283
页数:11
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