Reconciliation dilemmas in post-Ba'athist Iraq: Truth commissions, media and ethno-sectarian conflicts

Based on field work conducted in post-Ba'ath Iraq, as well as a study of official statements, print and broadcast media and insurgent communiques and interviews with proponents of truth and reconciliation in post-war Iraq, this article examines attempts to create a truth and reconciliation committee to settle differences and tensions between former members of the party and communities affected by its collective policies. It shows that in 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority failed to endorse plans based on the South African model. Instead, it embarked on a policy of de-Ba'athification which eventually fed into the insurgency. Since then, the Arab League and Prime Minister Maliki have launched attempts to foster national reconciliation. The article argues that these initiatives failed because the idea of reconciliation from the outset was tied to greater political dynamics.