Happy taxation: increasing tax compliance through positive rewards?

被引:39
作者
Brockmann, Hilke [1 ]
Genschel, Philipp [2 ]
Seelkopf, Laura [3 ]
机构
[1] Jacobs Univ Bremen, Sch Humanities & Social Sci, D-28759 Bremen, Germany
[2] European Univ Inst, Robert Schuman Ctr Adv Studies, Fiesole, Italy
[3] Univ Bremen, Res Ctr Inequal & Social Policy, D-28359 Bremen, Germany
关键词
donation; gender; laboratory experiment; lottery; tax evasion; GENDER-DIFFERENCES; EVASION; MORALE; ATTITUDES; VOLUNTARY; IMPACT; WOMEN; PRICE;
D O I
10.1017/S0143814X15000331
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Can governments increase tax compliance by rewarding honest taxpayers? We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment comparing tax compliance under a "deterrence" baseline with tax compliance under two "reward" treatments: a "donation" treatment giving taxpayers a say in the spending purposes of their payments and a "lucky" treatment giving taxpayers the (highly unlikely) chance of winning a lottery. The reward treatments significantly affected tax behaviour but not in a straightforward manner. Although female participants altered their behaviour as expected and complied somewhat more, men strongly reacted in the opposite manner: they evaded a much higher percentage of taxes than under the baseline. Apparently, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to boost tax compliance.
引用
收藏
页码:381 / 406
页数:26
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