NATURE AND SUBSTANCE THE CASE OF ARTIFACTS IN ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

被引：0

作者：

Gonzalez Varela, Jose Edgar ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Nacl Autonoma Mexico, Mexico City 04510, DF, Mexico

来源：

IDEAS Y VALORES | 2016年 / 65卷 / 161期

关键词：

Aristotle; R; Katayama; artifacts; substance;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Aristotle seems to deny the ontological status of artifacts which are not substances. In this paper I discuss the basic regarding this topic and its main intepretations. I discuss R. Katayama's opinion to show that he is right to underline the importance of the trait of separation, but he is wrong regarding the the notion of separation. My thesis is that neither the forms of natural things nor those of artifacts are separable from the composites, but the former possess a different kind of separation from other forms or species, which the latter do not possess. Hence, the former are substances.

引用

页码：185 / 215

页数：31

共 20 条

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[2]

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[3]

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[4]

Block Irving., 1978, Paideia: Special Aristotle Issue, P59

[5]

Devereux DanielT., 1994, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, V12, P63

[6]

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[7]

Fine Gail., 1993, On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms

[8]

Fine Gail., 1984, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, V2, P31

[9]

Gerson L.P., 1984, Apeiron, V18, P50

[10]

Gill MaryLouise., 1989, Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity

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