Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out

被引：33
|
作者：
Grosse, Matthew [1 ]
Kean, Stephen [1 ]
Scott, Tom [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Technol Sydney, Accounting Discipline Grp, Sydney, NSW, Australia
[2] Univ Auckland, Grad Sch Management, Auckland, New Zealand
来源：
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE | 2017年 / 57卷 / 03期
关键词：
Executive compensation; Shareholder resolutions; Say on pay; Remuneration disclosure; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; REMUNERATION; DIRECTORS; ACTIVISM; FINANCE; UK;
D O I：
10.1111/acfi.12176
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non-binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a strike'. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book-to-market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non-strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.
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页码：701 / 725
页数：25
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