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Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out
被引:33
|作者:
Grosse, Matthew
[1
]
Kean, Stephen
[1
]
Scott, Tom
[2
]
机构:
[1] Univ Technol Sydney, Accounting Discipline Grp, Sydney, NSW, Australia
[2] Univ Auckland, Grad Sch Management, Auckland, New Zealand
关键词:
Executive compensation;
Shareholder resolutions;
Say on pay;
Remuneration disclosure;
EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS;
FIRM PERFORMANCE;
REMUNERATION;
DIRECTORS;
ACTIVISM;
FINANCE;
UK;
D O I:
10.1111/acfi.12176
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non-binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a strike'. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book-to-market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non-strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.
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页码:701 / 725
页数:25
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