Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out

被引:33
|
作者
Grosse, Matthew [1 ]
Kean, Stephen [1 ]
Scott, Tom [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Technol Sydney, Accounting Discipline Grp, Sydney, NSW, Australia
[2] Univ Auckland, Grad Sch Management, Auckland, New Zealand
关键词
Executive compensation; Shareholder resolutions; Say on pay; Remuneration disclosure; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; REMUNERATION; DIRECTORS; ACTIVISM; FINANCE; UK;
D O I
10.1111/acfi.12176
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non-binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a strike'. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book-to-market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non-strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.
引用
收藏
页码:701 / 725
页数:25
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay: UK Evidence
    Voulgaris, Georgios
    Stathopoulos, Konstantinos
    Walker, Martin
    CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 2010, 18 (06) : 511 - 526
  • [22] Export diversification, CEO compensation and CEO pay-performance sensitivity: lesson from china
    Dai, Hui
    Xing, Licong
    Khan, Yousaf Ali
    CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY, 2024, 43 (09) : 8133 - 8148
  • [23] Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes
    Hooghiemstra, Reggy
    Kuang, Yu Flora
    Qin, Bo
    ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH, 2017, 47 (06) : 695 - 729
  • [24] Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Management
    Laux, Christian
    Laux, Volker
    ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2009, 84 (03) : 869 - 891
  • [25] Shareholder Voice on Executive Pay: A Decade of Dutch Say on Pay
    Van der Elst, Christoph
    Lafarre, Anne
    EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW, 2017, 18 (01) : 51 - 83
  • [26] Shareholder Voice on Executive Pay: A Decade of Dutch Say on Pay
    Christoph Van der Elst
    Anne Lafarre
    European Business Organization Law Review, 2017, 18 : 51 - 83
  • [27] Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay
    Ertimur, Yonca
    Ferri, Fabrizio
    Oesch, David
    JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2013, 51 (05) : 951 - 996
  • [28] Equity-based incentives and shareholder say-on-pay
    Collins, Denton
    Marquardt, Blair B.
    Niu, Xu
    JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, 2019, 46 (5-6) : 739 - 761
  • [29] Say on pay votes, subsequent firm performance, and CEO risk-taking behavior
    Omar, Ayishat
    Sun, Huey-Lian
    Tang, Alex P.
    JOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, 2022, 33 (04) : 9 - 21
  • [30] Aligning CEO compensation with sustainability performance: the role of CEO duality, board size, and compensation committees
    Shabbir, Muhammad Farooq
    Hanaysha, Jalal Rajeh
    Oon, Elain Yen Nee
    Asif, Muhammad
    Aslam, Hassan Danial
    DISCOVER SUSTAINABILITY, 2024, 5 (01):