Roots of Responsibilities to Financial Statement Fraud Control

被引:2
作者
Mohamed, Norazida [1 ]
Handley-Schachler, Morrison [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Teknol MARA, Fac Accountancy, Kelantan Campus, Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia
[2] Univ Teesside, Middlesbrough, Cleveland, England
来源
7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCIAL CRIMINOLOGY 2015, 7TH ICFC 2015 | 2015年 / 28卷
关键词
AGENCY;
D O I
10.1016/S2212-5671(15)01080-1
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Financial statement fraud cases also occur when weak internal controls exist. Besides these reasons, the research differentiates between the two major types of financial statement fraud. This research discusses the responsibilities of financial statement fraud control by looking at agency theory, stakeholder theory, public interest theory; capital needs theory and communication theory. This discussion is in tandem with the principal investigation of internal control strategies in relation to financial statement fraud control. The output of this paper provides a comprehensive understanding of responsibilities for financial statement fraud control in the context of the above theories and finally contributes recommendations for improvement in financial statement fraud control in public interest entities. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license.
引用
收藏
页码:46 / 52
页数:7
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