Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets

被引：0

作者：

Sotomayor, Marilda ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] EPGE Brazilian Sch Econ & Finance, Rio De Janeiro, RJ, Brazil

[2] Univ Sao Paulo, Dept Econ, Sao Paulo, SP, Brazil

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2022年 / 51卷 / 01期

关键词：

Cooperative equilibrium; Stability; Matching; Pairwise-stability; Choice-function; COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM; STABILITY;

D O I：

10.1007/s00182-021-00788-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper shows that the college admissions model with responsive preferences is not always satisfactory for representing real college admissions markets. Simple examples are used to illustrate real situations, in which the knowledge of the preferences of the institutions over all possible assignments of candidates is necessary for the analysis of relevant problems for the markets under consideration.

引用

页码：155 / 167

页数：13

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