A note on mathematical pluralism and logical pluralism

Mathematical pluralism notes that there are many different kinds of pure mathematical structures-notably those based on different logics-and that, qua pieces of pure mathematics, they are all equally good. Logical pluralism is the view that there are different logics (consequence relations), which are, in an appropriate sense, equally good. Some, such as Shapiro (Varieties of logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), have argued that mathematical pluralism entails logical pluralism. In this brief note I argue that this does not follow. There is a crucial distinction to be drawn between the preservation of truth (simpliciter) and the preservation of truth-in-a-structure; and once this distinction is drawn, this suffices to block the argument. The paper starts by clarifying the relevant notions of mathematical and logical pluralism. It then explains why the argument from the first to the second does not follow. A final section considers a few objections.