In this paper we address multi-criteria simple games which constitute an extension of the basic framework of voting systems and related social-choice situations. For these games, we propose the extended Shapley-Shubik index as the natural generalization of the Shapley-Shubik index in conventional simple games, and establish an axiomatic characterization of this power index. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Univ Caen Basse Normandie, CREM, UMR 6211, CNRS, Caen, FranceUniv Caen Basse Normandie, CREM, UMR 6211, CNRS, Caen, France
Courtin, Sebastien
Nganmeni, Zephirin
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Univ Cergy Pontoise, THEMA, UMR 8184, CNRS, Cergy Pontoise, FranceUniv Caen Basse Normandie, CREM, UMR 6211, CNRS, Caen, France
Nganmeni, Zephirin
Tchantcho, Bertrand
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Univ Cergy Pontoise, THEMA, UMR 8184, CNRS, Cergy Pontoise, France
Univ Yaounde I, Adv Teachers Training Coll, Yaounde, CameroonUniv Caen Basse Normandie, CREM, UMR 6211, CNRS, Caen, France
机构:
Univ Santiago de Compostela, Dept Estat Anal Matemat & Optimizac, Santiago De Compostela, SpainUniv Barcelona, Dept Matemat Econ Financera & Actuarial, Barcelona, Spain