Public interest versus interest groups: a political economy analysis of allowance allocation under the EU emissions trading scheme

被引：8

作者：

Anger, Niels ^{[1
]}

Asane-Otoo, Emmanuel ^{[2
]}

Boehringer, Christoph ^{[2
]}

Oberndorfer, Ulrich ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] European Commiss, DG Energy, Brussels, Belgium

[2] Carl von Ossietzky Univ Oldenburg, Dept Econ, Oldenburg, Germany

[3] OECD, Paris, France

来源：

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS-POLITICS LAW AND ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 16卷 / 05期

关键词：

Emissions trading; Interest groups; German ETS firms;

D O I：

10.1007/s10784-015-9285-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a theoretical analysis, we use a common agency model to show that lobbying by energy-intensive sectors covered under an emissions trading scheme (ETS) shifts the regulatory burden of an economy-wide emission constraint to sectors outside the ETS. The emission tax on the latter becomes inefficiently high such that lobbying does not only induce burden shifting but also efficiency losses. A complementary empirical analysis for a cross section of German firms under the EU emissions trading scheme supports our theoretical result on the role of lobbying on allowance allocation.

引用

页码：621 / 638

页数：18

共 35 条

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