Corruption, institutional trust and political engagement in Peru

被引:35
作者
Beesley, Celeste [1 ]
Hawkins, Darren [1 ]
机构
[1] Brigham Young Univ, Polit Sci Dept, 745 KMBL, Provo, UT 84602 USA
关键词
Corruption; Political trust; Experiment; Anti-corruption behavior; FIELD EXPERIMENT; VOTER TURNOUT; PERCEPTIONS; SUPPORT; IMPACT; INFORMATION; PERFORMANCE; GOVERNMENT; ATTITUDES; TAXES;
D O I
10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105743
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Widespread corruption and lack of trust in political institutions are common development problems that are likely deeply interconnected. We contribute to the existing understanding of their relationship using survey experimental methods and by investigating how different dimensions of corruption affect trust. Does grand versus petty corruption affect citizen trust in political institutions? What about corruption with positive versus negative consequences? After presenting respondents in Peru with randomly assigned information about these specific aspects of political corruption, we measure 1) attitudes about trust in government institutions and 2) behavioral engagement in anti-corruption efforts through dona-tions to a well-known Peruvian NGO. We find that petty corruption, but not grand corruption, decreased institutional trust compared to a control. Additionally, in contrast to previous findings showing that "beneficial" corruption reduces electoral punishments for individual politicians, both positive and nega-tive consequences decreased institutional trust. Corruption information did not alter donations to an NGO. Going beyond the correlations found in prior observational studies, this paper demonstrates a cau-sal relationship between corruption information and institutional trust. Our results signal the importance of addressing petty corruption to improve public trust. They also emphasize important difficulties in motivating citizen action against corruption because anti-corruption messaging can decrease trust, while failing to motivate even low-cost political action. (c) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页数:12
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