A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions

被引：116

作者：

Kwasnica, AM ^{[1
]}

Ledyard, JO

Porter, D

DeMartini, C

机构：

[1] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

[2] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA

[3] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA

[4] George Mason Univ, Interdisciplinary Ctr Econ Sci, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA

[5] RAND Corp, Santa Monica, CA 90407 USA

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2005年 / 51卷 / 03期

关键词：

auctions; experimental economics; combinatorial auctions;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.1040.0334

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

In this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental test's of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) design used by the FCC to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989, "Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach," RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1-25). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. Our experiments demonstrate that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, higher net revenues, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.

引用

页码：419 / 434

页数：16