The contestable outcome as a Bertrand equilibrium

被引：13

作者：

Chaudhuri, PR

机构：

[1] ITD, Sch. of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1996年 / 50卷 / 02期

关键词：

Bertrand competition; contestability; increasing returns;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(95)00742-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a Bertrand duopoly with increasing returns to scale where firms simultaneously decide on their prices and outputs. The unique equilibrium of this game yields the contestable outcome.

引用

页码：237 / 242

页数：6