The role of information processing cost as the foundation of bounded rationality in game theory

被引：5
|
作者：
Horaguchi, H
机构：
[1] HOSEI UNIV,FAC BUSINESS ADM,CHIYODA KU,TOKYO 100,JAPAN
[2] HARVARD UNIV,DEPT ECON,LITTAUER CTR,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1996年 / 51卷 / 03期
关键词：
bounded rationality; information processing cost; Nash equilibrium;
D O I：
10.1016/0165-1765(96)00828-2
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper explores whether the existence of information processing costs in game theory leads to a model of bounded rationality. The model of bounded rationality is derived from an enumeration framework, which yields the result that a search process for the Nash equilibria is information cost efficient in a pure strategy.
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页码：287 / 294
页数：8
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