Selectively Assertive: Interventions of India's Supreme Court to Enforce Environmental Laws

被引:3
作者
Iyengar, Shalini [1 ]
Dolsak, Nives [2 ]
Prakash, Aseem [3 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Law Sch, 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Univ Washington, Sch Marine & Environm Affairs, Seattle 3707 Brooklyn Ave NE,Box 355685, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
[3] Univ Washington, Dept Polit Sci, Ctr Environm Polit, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
关键词
environmental laws; environmental litigation; pollution; India; PUBLIC-INTEREST LITIGATION; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE; FAILED STATES; POLITICS; CORRUPTION; ACTIVISM; JUSTICE; THREATS;
D O I
10.3390/su11247234
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
We examine why India's Supreme Court has selectively intervened to enforce environmental laws. While the Indian Judiciary has substantial political insulation, judges recognize the need for tactical balancing to preserve the legitimacy of their institution. We examine four cases: judicial interventions to check water pollution from tanneries and to phase out diesel engines, and judicial non-intervention to prevent degradation of wetlands and to check crop burning in states adjacent to Delhi. We suggest that judges intervened to correct enforcement failure when they do not anticipate pushback from organized constituencies. Where judicial action imposes costs on a large number of actors and motivates protests from organized groups, the justices have tended to overlook enforcement failures. In sum, in spite of political insulation, judges remain attentive to the popular mood and interest-group politics.
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页数:18
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