A new axiomatization of the core of games with transferable utility

被引：28

作者：

Voorneveld, M

van den Nouweland, A

机构：

[1] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econometr, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

[2] Tilburg Univ, CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

[3] Univ Oregon, Dept Econ, Eugene, OR 97403 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1998年 / 60卷 / 02期

关键词：

core; consistency; games with transferable utility;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00107-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Using a new definition of reduced games, we provide an axiomatization of the core for games with transferable utility using restricted nonemptiness, individual rationality and consistency. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：151 / 155

页数：5