Unconstrained Capital? Multinational companies, structural power, and collective goods provision in dual VET

Collective goods provision, most prominent in coordinated market economies, depends on certain institutional conditions that constrain employer behavior and trigger cooperation. Increased capital mobility, characterized by new exit opportunities for business and an influx of multinational companies not anchored in their new home-countries' institutional environment, loosens those 'beneficial constraints'. I argue that these challenges do not lead to convergence between globalized locations as the structural power of business depends on the type of firms attracted by local institutional comparative advantages. Comparing collective skill formation in two heavily globalized cantons of Switzerland, I show that a region fundamentally relying on low-tax policies sees its hands increasingly tied in the face of globalization. It must accordingly reshape collective goods provision around policies favored by business. In contrast, a location with more diverse comparative advantages is able to implement more compelling policy elements that punish uncooperative firms.