Economic policy in the presence of coordination problems

被引：1

作者：

Cooper, RW ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas, Dept Econ, Austin, TX 78712 USA

来源：

REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE | 2005年 / 115卷 / 04期

关键词：

coordination games; economic policy; multiple equilibria;

D O I：

10.3917/redp.154.0379

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper discusses the conduct of government policy in coordination games. In economic situations with multiple equilibria, government intervention may be valuable to overcome coordination problems and to internalize externalities. Yet, the design optimal interventions is made more difficult by the presence of strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria.

引用

页码：379 / 390

页数：12

共 18 条

[1]

[Anonymous], MODERN BUSINESS CYCL

[2]

Baxter M., 1991, 53 FED RES BANK MINN

[3] INDETERMINACY AND INCREASING RETURNS [J].