Optimal compensation rule under provider adverse selection and moral hazard

被引：4

作者：

Wu, Yaping ^{[1
]}

Chen, Yijuan ^{[2
]}

Li, Sanxi ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Nanjing Audit Univ, Inst Econ & Finance, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China

[2] Australian Natl Univ, Res Sch Econ, Canberra, ACT, Australia

[3] Renmin Univ China, Sch Econ, Beijing 10072, Peoples R China

来源：

HEALTH ECONOMICS | 2018年 / 27卷 / 03期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

fee-for-service; pay-for-performance; provider compensation; provider moral hazard and adverse selection; HEALTH-CARE; PAYMENT; SERVICES; COST; INFORMATION; PHYSICIANS; CONTRACTS; QUALITY; REIMBURSEMENT; MULTITASKING;

D O I：

10.1002/hec.3590

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Although healthcare provider payments have been studied extensively in the literature, little is known about the optimal compensation rule when, in addition to unobservable provider effort (moral hazard), the provider's ability type is also private information (adverse selection). We find that when only provider effort is unobservable, to induce the first-best outcome the optimal compensation rule requires zero fee-for-service. When both provider moral hazard and adverse selection exist, the first-best outcome will be infeasible. The second-best compensation rule entails combined use of capitation, fee-for-service, and pay-for-performance.

引用

页码：509 / 524

页数：16