Customization of incentive mechanisms based on product life-cycle phases for an efficient product-service supply chain coordination

被引:11
作者
Asl-Najafi, Javad [1 ]
Yaghoubi, Saeed [1 ]
Noori, Siamak [1 ]
机构
[1] Iran Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Ind Engn, Tehran, Iran
关键词
Supply chain coordination; Product life-cycle; Collaboration; Sales effort; Contract; REVENUE-SHARING CONTRACTS; EFFORT DECISIONS; LEARNING-CURVE; PRICE; PROMOTION; COMPETITION; RETAILER; POLICIES; DEMAND;
D O I
10.1016/j.compind.2021.103582
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
"Product life-cycle management" and "supply chain coordination" are integral concepts in today's competitive business environment, each of which alone is of particular importance in the literature. However, the coordination process of channels with short and long life-cycles may require distinct approaches in practice. This study surveys the coordination strategies in product-service supply chains that benefit from a long product life-cycle. One of the distinguishing features of such channels is that at the start of each life cycle phase, there is sufficient time to adapt strategies, decisions, and coordination processes to various characteristics of that stage. Coordination of members of product-service supply chain in which the market demand, pricing, and sales effort patterns are dynamically specified following the features of each phase is the general discussion of current research. Three distinct incentive schemes are developed under the Stackelberg game to realize the coordination goals with the use of decentralized and centralized decision making structures. The analytical results indicate that at the beginning of each stage, the adopted coordination plan should be customized according to the properties of the respective phase because all decisions are varying by passing through the different phases. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:15
相关论文
共 50 条
[41]   Price and warranty competition in a duopoly distribution channel: dynamic stability analysis for boundedly rational agents [J].
Sarmah, S. P. ;
Sinha, Santanu ;
Kumar, Lalit .
IMA JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT MATHEMATICS, 2015, 26 (03) :299-324
[42]   Marketing-driven channel coordination with revenue-sharing contracts under price promotion to end-customers [J].
Sheu, Jiuh-Biing .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2011, 214 (02) :246-255
[43]  
Short T.K., 1985, PLANN REV, V13, P18
[44]   Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects [J].
Taylor, TA .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2002, 48 (08) :992-1007
[45]   Effects of promotion cost sharing policy with the sales learning curve on supply chain coordination [J].
Tsao, Yu-Chung ;
Sheen, Gwo-Ji .
COMPUTERS & OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2012, 39 (08) :1872-1878
[46]   An uncooperative ordering policy with time-varying price and learning curve for time-varying demand under trade credit [J].
Wu, Chengfeng ;
Zhao, Qiuhong .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING, 2017, 11 (03) :380-402
[47]   Supply chain coordination with two-part tariffs under information asymmetry [J].
Wu, Chongqi ;
Li, Kunpeng ;
Shi, Tianqin .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH, 2017, 55 (09) :2575-2589
[48]   Coordinating a two-supplier and one-retailer supply chain with forecast updating [J].
Yang, Danqin ;
Choi, Tsan-Ming ;
Xiao, Tiaojun ;
Cheng, T. C. E. .
AUTOMATICA, 2011, 47 (07) :1317-1329
[49]   Call, put and bidirectional option contracts in agricultural supply chains with sales effort [J].
Yang, Lei ;
Tang, Ruihong ;
Chen, Kebing .
APPLIED MATHEMATICAL MODELLING, 2017, 47 :1-16
[50]   Coordinating contracts for supply chains that market with mail-in rebates and retailer promotions [J].
Yang, Shilei ;
Munson, Charles L. ;
Chen, Bintong ;
Shi, Chunming .
JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY, 2015, 66 (12) :2025-+