Justification Awareness Models

被引:8
作者
Artemov, Sergei [1 ]
机构
[1] CUNY, Grad Ctr, 365 Fifth Ave, New York, NY 10016 USA
来源
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE (LFCS 2018) | 2018年 / 10703卷
关键词
Modal logic; Justification logic; Epistemology; Knowledge; Belief; LOGIC;
D O I
10.1007/978-3-319-72056-2_2
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
Justification Awareness Models, JAMs, incorporate two principal ideas: (i) justifications are prime objects of the model: knowledge and belief are defined evidence-based concepts; (ii) awareness restrictions are applied to justifications rather than to propositions, which allows for the maintaining of desirable closure properties. JAMs naturally include major justification models, Kripke models and, in addition, represent situations with multiple possibly fallible justifications. As an example, we build a JAM for Russell's well-known Prime Minister scenario which, in full generality, was previously off the scope of rigorous epistemic modeling.
引用
收藏
页码:22 / 36
页数:15
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