Along with globalization of the construction market, international construction firms often choose to cooperate with local construction firms in the form of Joint Ventures (JV) when they enter into the domestic markets of different countries. In this way, they cannot only reduce investment risks, but also enhance production efficiency, reduce costs and generate more profits. The conventional method of profit-sharing between JV firms is based on ratio of investment. However, as the firms make different contributions to the project, the rationality of such a profit-sharing method is often doubtful and thus is difficult to maintain a stable cooperative relationship for a JV team. Based on the concept of the cooperative game theory, this paper proposes a contribution-based profit-sharing model using Shapley Value. A case study is used to describe how firms can use this model to reach decisions of participation, and determine a fair profit-sharing rule after cooperation to enhance mutual trust and create the advantages of cooperation.
机构:
Rikkyo Univ, Fac Econ, 3-34-1 Nishi Ikebukuro,Toshima, Tokyo 1718511, JapanRikkyo Univ, Fac Econ, 3-34-1 Nishi Ikebukuro,Toshima, Tokyo 1718511, Japan
机构:
Univ Hawaii, Dept Econ, 2424 Maile Way,Saunders Hall 542, Honolulu, HI 96822 USAUniv Hawaii, Dept Econ, 2424 Maile Way,Saunders Hall 542, Honolulu, HI 96822 USA
Juarez, Ruben
Nitta, Kohei
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Chiba Univ Commerce, Dept Econ, 1-3-1 Konodai, Ichikawa, Chiba 2728512, JapanUniv Hawaii, Dept Econ, 2424 Maile Way,Saunders Hall 542, Honolulu, HI 96822 USA
Nitta, Kohei
Vargas, Miguel
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Univ Santiago de Cali, Dept Operat Res, Santiago De Cali 760035, ColombiaUniv Hawaii, Dept Econ, 2424 Maile Way,Saunders Hall 542, Honolulu, HI 96822 USA