CONTRIBUTION-BASED PROFIT-SHARING SCHEME FOR JOINT VENTURES

被引:17
作者
Hsueh, Sung-Lin [2 ]
Yan, Min-Ren [1 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Culture Univ SCE, Dept Int Business Adm, Taipei 106, Taiwan
[2] Tung Fang Design Univ, Dept Interior Design, Hu Nei Shang Kaohsiung H, Taiwan
关键词
profit-sharing; joint venture; cooperation; strategic alliance; game theory; Shapley value; RISK-MANAGEMENT; MODEL; PROJECTS;
D O I
10.3846/20294913.2011.580578
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Along with globalization of the construction market, international construction firms often choose to cooperate with local construction firms in the form of Joint Ventures (JV) when they enter into the domestic markets of different countries. In this way, they cannot only reduce investment risks, but also enhance production efficiency, reduce costs and generate more profits. The conventional method of profit-sharing between JV firms is based on ratio of investment. However, as the firms make different contributions to the project, the rationality of such a profit-sharing method is often doubtful and thus is difficult to maintain a stable cooperative relationship for a JV team. Based on the concept of the cooperative game theory, this paper proposes a contribution-based profit-sharing model using Shapley Value. A case study is used to describe how firms can use this model to reach decisions of participation, and determine a fair profit-sharing rule after cooperation to enhance mutual trust and create the advantages of cooperation.
引用
收藏
页码:445 / 458
页数:14
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