Cournot competition and "green" innovation: An inverted-U relationship

被引：100

作者：

Lambertini, Luca ^{[1
]}

Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna ^{[2
,3
]}

Tampieri, Alessandro ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bologna, Str Maggiore 45, I-40125 Bologna, BO, Italy

[2] La Trobe Univ, Plenty Rd, Melbourne, Vic 3086, Australia

[3] ICRE8, Athens, Greece

[4] Univ Florence, Dept Econ, Via Pandette 9, I-50127 Florence, Italy

来源：

ENERGY ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 68卷

关键词：

Green" R&D; R&D spillovers; Emission taxation; Precommitted regulator; Cournot oligopoly; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; CLEANER TECHNOLOGIES; ADOPTION; POLICY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.eneco.2017.09.022

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry where production is polluting and R&D has the aim to reduce emissions ("green" innovation). Wepresent an n-firm oligopoly where firms compete in quantities and decide their investment in "green" R&D. We analyse the case where the emission tax is set endogenously by a committed regulator and uncover an inverted-U relationship between innovation and competition that is mainly driven by the presence of R&D spillovers. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：116 / 123

页数：8

共 27 条

[1] Competition and growth with step-by-step innovation: An example [J].